I. Introduction
Developing countries have expanded their share of international trade and investment significantly over the past decade. Numerically they now dominate the present 139 members of the World Trade Organisation (as of October 2000) and a further 30 countries are seeking to join, including China and Russia. Although this would seem to place developing countries in a position from which to exert a much stronger voice over trade negotiations, the last few years have seen many of them become increasingly disenchanted with the operations of the WTO and the global trading system in general. Several experienced considerable social and economic disruption during the financial turmoil in emerging markets in 1997 and 1998, casting doubt on the benefits of greater international integration. Many feel that the industrialised countries are delaying the implementation of their obligations arising out of the Uruguay Round agreements. The Ministerial talks in Seattle in 1999 were a failure, with developing countries feeling that their interests and concerns were being neglected in the negotiating agenda.
Inevitably this has reduced the enthusiasm of many governments for participating in further rounds of trade and investment talks and has raised hostility towards the WTO in parts of civil society. Yet international trade and investment liberalisation are far from complete, suggesting that it may still be worthwhile to pursue reforms to the multilateral trading system that seek to improve market access. The objective of this paper is to assess the evidence for the proposition that the interests of developing countries will be enhanced through greater international openness and to draw out some of the implications of that evidence for the issues confronting them in any future round of negotiations.
The trade liberalisation that has taken place over the past fifty years can be conveniently separated into four phases; the period 1947-61 following the inception of GATT, the Kennedy Round from 1964-67, the Tokyo Round from 1973-79 and the Uruguay Round. Prior to the Uruguay Round the developing countries did not participate fully in all the multilateral negotiations. This is not to say that they did not benefit from them. The 'Most Favoured Nation' (MFN) principle enforced under GATT meant that tariff reductions granted to one trading partner had to be granted to all GATT members. However the focus of the negotiations was obviously on the principal issues of interest to the industrialised countries, and so textiles, clothing and agriculture tended to receive less attention than other manufactured products. Developing countries also benefited from the preferential access extended by many industrialising economies under the Generalised System of Preferences to the socalled 'Group of 77' countries, although again some key product lines were frequently excluded, and quantitative restrictions were sometimes imposed.
In contrast developing countries participated actively in the Uruguay Round negotiations, and signed the Agreement in its entirety. One reason for this was a growing acceptance by many of them, and a heavy emphasis in the policy advice given by multilateral institutions, that openness and the liberalisation of trade and investment policies were essential for successful development. It also reflected a gradual undermining of the intellectual consensus that had previously favoured import-substituting regimes as a means of stimulating industrialisation (Kreuger, 1997) .
Greater international integration is widely regarded as a pre-requisite for improved economic performance by developing countries. Opening up to international trade and reducing barriers to capital flows are both thought to improve the prospects for economic growth, with consequent improvements in per capita incomes. Trade and capital flows provide a means of closing what Romer (1993) terms 'idea gaps' and 'object gaps'. Foreign financial assistance can for instance enhance domestic savings and finance additional fixed capital. Foreign-owned firms can help to bring new knowledge into host economies. Exporting provides a means of financing the purchase of foreign capital equipment that is likely to be significantly cheaper, and of better quality, than that manufactured at home.
Openness also has many other dimensions. An important one which is not considered in detail in this paper concerns the timing and consequences of full capital account liberalisation. This is not a direct part of a potential Millennium Round agenda, although many of the issues raised in the debate over the impact of capital account liberalisation on development are similar to those raised in the literature on trade liberalisation and development, as the discussions in Stiglitz (1998) and Rodrik (2000) make clear.
Successful development delivers improved living standards. This is not simply a matter of raising GDP per capita, but also involves other factors that lead to an enhanced quality of life, such as lower poverty and longer life expectancy. However in this paper we concentrate on the relationship between openness and per capita incomes, partly to keep matters to a manageable length. Arguably higher incomes also provide one means of achieving the broader social goals of the development process, as suggested in the recent review of the wider relationships between trade liberalisation and poverty by Ben-David et al (2000) .
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we review the role of developing economies in international trade and highlight differing developments in individual regions. The experience of East Asia has clearly been different from that of other regions, both in terms of movements in the share of global trade and in terms of growth in real per capita incomes since the mid-1960s. In Section III we look at trends in the global pattern of foreign direct investment. This reveals the growing share of new investments now being located in developing countries, although as with international trade, the gains do not appear to have been distributed evenly amongst all regions, with Africa in particular having received comparatively little new investment.
It is clear that the interests of developing countries cannot easily be generalised, and they will not all share the same interests or concerns in different aspects of future trade negotiations. Entry of China, and potentially the Russian federation, into the WTO will also change the balance of interests significantly, simply because of the size and political influence of both economies. The phasing out of quotas on textiles and clothing in industrialised countries becomes much more significant if Chinese producers are also to enjoy barrier-free entry. Discussions over the restrictions imposed on foreign investors by host economies also become more important given the scale of inward investment in China.
Section IV contains a review of the evidence linking trade and foreign direct investment to economic growth and development. It considers the role of international trade, and in particular the impact of exporting on performance, and then reviews the evidence on inward investment and growth in developing economies. There is also a discussion of the lessons to be learned from the experience of Mexico, where significant changes have occurred in trade and investment policies over the past two decades. The evidence reviewed does suggest that greater international openness can help to raise per capita incomes, but the gains from greater openness are by no means automatic. Openness is part of a development strategy, not a substitute for one, and, as discussed in Section V, needs to be complemented by investments in human capital and institutional reforms tailored to domestic needs and objectives rather than preferences imposed by industrialised countries. This does not mean that developing countries should not seek to make their economies more open to international trade, investment and knowledge, but simply that the difficulties they face in adjusting to full liberalisation should be taken into account in any round of trade negotiations. It also needs to be recognised that many developing countries presently lack the administrative capacity to participate effectively in the WTO.
Section VI contains a discussion of some of the key issues on which any future trade negotiations are likely to focus, including the built-in agenda from the Uruguay Round to improve market access in agriculture and services and review the Agreements on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). It also considers whether the agenda should be broadened to include labour and environmental standards and whether some developing countries should continue to receive 'special and differential treatment'.
From a perspective of openness and development it is clear that the main emphasis of any future trade round should be on measures that aim to reduce barriers to trade and enhance the contestability of product markets, whilst recognising that it may take some time for many developing economies to build up the necessary institutional capacities to participate effectively in the WTO process. Measures to impose the labour and environmental standards of the industrialised countries on developing economies have little to do with enhancing market contestability, and should be discussed in more appropriate multilateral fora. The agreements reached in the Uruguay Round can be seen as ones in which many low income economies have taken on mandatory commitments in exchange for non-binding promises of assistance from industrialised countries, many of which have yet to materialise. If the next round is to be a true 'development round' this potentially destructive imbalance should be redressed, with negotiations guided by the basic principles of fairness and comprehensiveness (Stiglitz, 2000) . Some other brief concluding comments are given in Section VII.
II. Trends In International Trade
Developing countries presently account for about 30 per cent of total world trade in merchandise products and in services.
1 The trends in their share of world trade are shown in Charts 1 and 2. It is clear that the share of developing economies declined over the 1980s, but began to recover during the 1990s. Based on the arithmetic average of the growth rate of imports and exports, the annual growth in the dollar value of developing countries merchandise trade averaged 7.4 per cent between 1990 and 1999, compared to just 2.4 per cent from 1980 to 1990. In contrast the annual rate of growth in developed economies' trade slowed to 4.9 per cent in the 1990s, compared to 6.6 per cent in the 1980s. It is encouraging that the growth rate of developed economies trade has begun to pick-up at a time when they have participated actively in trade liberalisation, but it is impossible to judge the extent to which these developments are related.
The rate of growth of developing economies trade in services also accelerated in the 1990s, although this may partly reflect improvements in statistical coverage. The average annual growth rate rose to 7.9 per cent from 6 per cent in the 1980s. Services have become an increasingly important part of developing countries trade, with services exports accounting for around 17½ per cent of the combined value of merchandise and services exports in 1999, compared to 10½ per cent in 1980. Thus it should not be surprising that many developing economies continue to have a strong interest in further trade liberalisation in services. Many are heavily dependent on services as a source of foreign exchange, reflecting specialisation in tourism or transportation services. A General Agreement on Trade in Services was one of the major results of the Uruguay Round negotiations, with national treatment and marketaccess commitments being applied to a number of service sectors, although coverage was far from complete.
There have also been some important changes in the structure of merchandise trade in developing countries. Up until the early 1980s the merchandise exports of developing countries were dominated by primary products, such as fuels, raw materials and agricultural produce, while exports from the industrialised countries largely comprised manufactured goods. Manufactures accounted for only a third of developing country exports. However growth has accelerated since then, and by the mid-1990s the share of manufactures in developing country exports had risen to over two-thirds. The share of fuels and minerals in total exports has declined from around one-half in 1981 to one-sixth by the mid-1990s, partly reflecting the sharp decline in real fuel prices during this period.
Thus developing countries now have a strong interest in seeking to include industrial products in any further WTO negotiations, even though this is not part of the built-in agenda from the Uruguay Round. Tariffs and non-tariff measures such as quotas and anti-dumping actions constitute a significant market access barrier for many developing producers of manufactured goods, both in industrialised and in other developing economies. Developing economies may also have more to gain from further liberalisation, since they tend to face higher tariff levels than producers in industrialised economies, as can be seen from Table 1 , which reports average tariff levels in 1995. There are two reasons for the higher tariffs faced by producers in developing economies. First, other developing economies are a more important market than they are for producers in industrialised countries, and these economies have higher average tariff levels. Secondly, manufactured goods from developed countries are relatively concentrated in lines such as processed food products, textiles and clothing. These are products with relatively high tariff levels in the industrialised economies, and also significant non-tariff barriers, such as the tariff-rate quotas introduced in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Analyses of further trade liberalisation using applied general equilibrium models also suggest that developing countries stand to make important collective gains from further tariff liberalisation, although inevitably there is little agreement about the precise magnitude of the gains. The OECD estimate that a full, global tariff liberalisation for agricultural and industrial goods would ultimately raise world GDP at constant prices by 3 per cent, equivalent to $1.2 billion on their baseline projections (OECD, 1999) . Output in the non-OECD area would rise by 4.9 per cent compared to 2.5 per cent in the OECD itself. In contrast Hertel (2000) estimates that full liberalisation (including also some measures that affect services) would raise world welfare by $350 million. However he agrees that the gains accruing to the developing countries would be significantly greater than their share of world GDP.
The above discussion highlighted some of the major trends in the trade patterns of developing economies. If these figures are decomposed by developing region it is clear that many countries will have different concerns and negotiating objectives in any future trade negotiations. Inevitably this reduces the chances of finding cohesive groupings of developing economies that can bargain collectively with the industrialised economies.
The export shares of five regions -Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Developing Europe are shown in Charts 3 and 4. The experience of many Asian economies has clearly been different to the others, with the developing economies in Asia having seen a sustained improvement in their share of world trade, both in services and merchandise trade. This has not been reflected in the overall share of world trade taken by developed economies because of the marked decline in the trade share of the Middle East and African economies associated in part with weak commodity prices, and the collapse in trade in the transition economies following the dissolution of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Michalopoulos, 1999) . However even in Latin America, which appears to have had a relatively stable trade share, the picture is bleak if Mexico is excluded, because much of the overall growth in trade in the 1990s has been due to the impact of the rapid growth in Mexican trade associated with NAFTA. The experience of Asia does not simply reflect the rapid development of the four NIEs -Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, which are now probably better classified as developed economies rather than developing ones. Their merchandise exports rose by 11 per cent per annum on average between 1980-99, but the rest of developing Asia still achieved growth of 9½ per cent per annum.
One important difference between the Asian economies and other developing regions is that a significantly higher proportion of their exports comprise manufactured products, as can be seen from Table 2 . This matters because the volume of trade in manufactures has been growing much more rapidly than other types of trade. Within the manufacturing sector many of the Asian economies are also relatively specialised in some of the fastest growing export sectors, notably office machinery and telecommunications equipment. However when looking at imports, it is not obvious that the interests of the Asian economies will be all that different to those of other developing regions, with manufactures accounting for around three-quarters of total merchandise imports in all of them.
Growth has been exceptionally strong in many Asian countries for many years, and there has been a long debate about the mainsprings of growth in this region and about what can be learnt from the experience of these countries. One strand of the debate has focused on the early moves by some of the Asian economies towards greater international openness in the 1960s and early 1970s. Cross-country growth studies suggest that this is one of the main factors that can account for the comparatively rapid growth in Asia over the past three decades. Whilst there has indeed been a focus on exporting in many of the countries this has been only a part of the overall development strategy in many. Openness to ideas and foreign knowledge, and a resulting concern with product quality, have been at least as important, as have institutional structures. Barrell et al (2000) discuss the different experiences of development in Korea and the former Soviet block. There were similarities in the growth process between South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s and Soviet Russia in the 1950s. Neither were pure market economies with independent firms undertaking actions in the interest of maximising the returns to private shareholders. In both cases there was a clear development plan with quantity objectives, and barriers to inward investment that meant that foreign firms were virtually excluded. But the difference, which is important for all the successful East Asian newly industrialised economies, is that the high levels of investment in Korea went into plant and machinery whose productive potential was gauged by its ability to produce goods for the international market. Trade linkages with the rest of the world ensured that information flowed into the economies and made it essential that modern standards of product quality were quickly absorbed in order to ensure plan fulfilment.
Complementary investments in education and training were also undertaken, raising the ability to absorb and adapt knowledge from other countries.
Russia did trade significantly, but largely with other members of the CMEA. Such trade rarely reflected underlying comparative advantages and soon disappeared once the transition process began. Michalopoulos (1999) highlights the case of the Bulgarian electronic and computer industry. In 1987 this employed more than 100,000 people and had intra-CMEA exports of $2 billion. By 1991 it had almost disappeared completely.
It is clear that there are no automatic links between greater openness and economic growth, although it does appear to be the case that those developing countries who have gained a greater share of world trade are also the ones whose per capita incomes have risen most rapidly. However these countries are the exception rather than the rule. During the past thirty years there has been a divergence, rather than a convergence, between the levels of per capita income in the industrialised countries and many developing countries. This can be seen from Chart 5, which shows the average annual growth rate of per capita incomes, measured in US dollars at 1987 prices and exchange rates in selected regions from 1970 to 1998. Similar results are reported in IMF (2000) using purchasing power parity rates. Table A2 .2, World Bank.
Annual Real Per Capita Income Growth 1966-98 (%)
Real per capita incomes rose by an average 2.5 per cent per annum in the industrialised countries. This rate of growth was exceeded only in Asia, particularly East Asia where incomes rose by an average 5.9 per cent per annum. China had a per capita income growth rate of 7½ per cent per annum. Real incomes have risen in developing countries in the Middle East and Latin America, but at a slower pace than in the industrialised countries. Real incomes hardly changed at all in sub-Saharan Africa, and have actually fallen since 1973. The transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe are part of the Developing Europe bloc in Chart 5. Whilst real per capita incomes are estimated to have risen over the period as a whole, there has been a sharp decline since transition began. In total approximately three-quarters of all the developing economies have recorded slower per capita income growth than the industrialised economies since 1970 (IMF, 2000) , although this group comprised only about 30 per cent of the total in terms of population, reflecting the relative success of China and, to a lesser extent, India which had a per capita growth rate of 2¾ per cent.
III. Trends In Global Foreign Direct Investment
Recent patterns of cross-border investment reflect changes in the structure of the world economy. Advances in technology and telecommunications have changed the feasible span of managerial control and the motivation for dispersed production. Liberalisation of trade and capital flows in many developed and developing economies has helped to improve market access for tradable products produced elsewhere.
Early supply-side models of foreign investment in developing economies emphasised the role of natural resources and differences in factor endowments. Investments in labour intensive activities would be made by capital rich countries in labour abundant countries. Barriers to trade were also important, with foreign investment necessary to enter large markets protected from imports by high tariff levels and quotas. However some countries such as India and Mexico which made considerable use of trade barriers to protect domestic producers, received relatively little investment for many years, suggesting that market size in itself was not always sufficient to attract investment.
Foreign investments in many developing economies are no longer dominated by the establishment of free-standing subsidiaries operating mining, agriculture and transportation facilities. The organisation of many businesses has changed, with many multinational firms choosing to reorganise their activities on a regional or global basis, with activities increasingly outsourced to lower cost locations. This has focused greater attention on trade polices in different locations. Subsidiaries that are part of integrated production systems in open economies are thought more likely to benefit from technological upgrading and managerial attention (Moran, 1998) . Exportorientated investments have been especially important in the high level of inward investment in developing economies in South and East Asia, as well as in small developed economies such as Ireland.
At the same time, widespread use of privatisation and the removal of regulations prohibiting foreign ownership in financial services, infrastructure and power generation and supply have stimulated new inward investment in previously closed service and construction activities. Investments driven by privatisation have been particularly important in Brazil and some of the transition economies. The increasing willingness of many governments to use build-operate-transfer (BOT) regulations has also helped to create new opportunities for investment in infrastructure projects in countries such as China.
The long-term trends in the location of direct investment are shown in Table 3 . In the first half of the twentieth century some two-thirds of all investments were located in the developing economies. Over the last forty years the picture has been quite different, with the vast majority of foreign direct investment taking place between the developed economies. Over two-thirds of all inward investments are now held within the developed economies. Table 3 .2) and UNCTAD (2000, Annex Table B3 ).
In part the concentration of investments in the industrialised economies reflects the growing role of proprietary assets in the spread of foreign investment (Markusen, 1995) . The decision to establish foreign subsidiaries is influenced by the need to appropriate the rents accruing from the development of firm-specific knowledgebased assets and practices. Greater use is now made of customised production for local markets rather than mass production of homogenous goods. Investments of this type are more likely to be located in other industrialised economies rather than developing economies (Caves, 1996) , although there are some examples, notably Singapore and Taiwan, where educational advances and skill upgrading have helped to attract technologically-advanced investments and R&D centres (Lall, 1998; Tu and Schive, 1995) .
Cross-border flows of capital, such as foreign direct investment, have also been stimulated by the liberalisation of national capital markets. All the major economies have dismantled their capital controls since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates in 1971 and the subsequent move to a floating exchange rate regime. At the same time many developing economies have opened up their capital accounts, extending the geographical scope of capital market integration.
The size of the stocks of foreign direct investment in the world economy means that it can take many years for changes in the geographical pattern of new flows of investment to become apparent in the distribution of the stocks. The geographical distribution of existing investments suggests that direct investment cannot simply be characterised as the movement of production to lower wage economies. However the stock data disguise an increasing tendency to locate new investments in the developing economies since 1990.
Trends in the location of new inflows of direct investment are reported in Table 4 . Developing economies have received 34 per cent of all new investments during the 1990s, compared to just 18 per cent of new investment in the latter half of the 1980s. The growth of inward investment has been especially rapid in South and East Asia, led by the rapid expansion of new investment in China, and more recently in Latin America. Excluding China, the developing economies received 26.1 per cent of all inward investment in the period from 1991-99. Again, Africa appears a notable exception to other regions, accounting for a declining share of total new investments in the developing economies.
Reforms introduced since 1991 have stimulated inward investment in China, both by expanding the areas of the economy open to foreign investors and by allowing full current account convertibility so that profits could be repatriated more easily. This reinforced the attractiveness of the large domestic market and the effectiveness of the range of incentives on offer in the special economic zones. Coughlin and Segev (2000) provide a discussion of recent trends in FDI in China.
Brazil, Mexico and Argentina are the most important hosts to inward investment in Latin America. Investments have been stimulated by privatisation policies as well as by the opportunities opened up through regional integration via NAFTA and Mercosur (Kuwayama, 1999) . The interaction between trade policies and inward investment in Mexico is discussed in greater detail below.
The emerging markets crisis led to a marked decline in the share of new investments in the developing economies in 1998 and 1999, although this was primarily confined to a few Asian economies. Most other developing economies experienced a further rise in inward investment, with notably rapid growth in service sector investments in Latin America. The overall share of new investments taken by developing economies was also affected by the rapid growth of investment in the developed economies, with strong equity markets helping to finance major cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the United States and Europe. These type of investments are not ones that most developing economies could hope or expect to attract.
FDI in the transition economies has accelerated since 1994. In the last five years inward investment amounted to 11½ per cent of the total level of inward investment in developing economies and about 4 per cent of total global inward investment. The proportion of foreign investments going to the transition economies has risen steadily since the early part of the decade. Investment continues to be dominated by privatisation related flows. Inflows jumped up in 1995, coinciding with the peak of the privatisation programmes in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Since that time there has been continuing high levels of investment in the Visegrad economies, augmented by rising resource-based investments in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and the onset of privatisation programmes in the Balkan States. As a group the transition economies appear to be performing much as might be expected given that they began from a position with little inward investment at all. At the end of 1999 the stock of inward investment in these economies represented 2.6 per cent of the total global stock of direct investment. This was broadly in line with their share of global GDP. If flows remain at the level seen over the past five years, then the share of the total FDI stock should rise further. 
IV. Openness And Growth

IV.1 International Trade: Theoretical Issues
There are numerous channels through which openness to trade, and in particular exports, might improve the prospects for growth. Traditional theories of trade under perfect competition have always indicated that trade can enhance allocative efficiency and welfare in the economy as a whole by allowing resources to be transferred from import-substituting activities into ones in which countries have a comparative advantage. Recent advances in trade and growth theory also stress the importance of imperfect competition, economies of scale, product diversity and the spread of ideas and organisational techniques across international borders.
Exporting is typically associated with an expansion in the size of the potential market facing the firm. Higher demand may thus allow an expansion in production and the exploitation of economies of scale, particularly in small countries or capital intensive activities in which the minimum efficient scale of production is large relative to the size of the home market.
Exposure to greater foreign competition may also generate improvements in exporters' performance, by eliminating organisational inefficiencies, irrespective of whether firms can learn from exporting. The domestic price of tradeable goods may also fall, relative to the level it would otherwise have been at, enhancing consumer welfare. However competition may not be without costs. Baldwin and Caves (1997) argue that competitive pressures will enhance turbulence, which they define in terms of entry and exit rates and gross job creation and destruction. Greater competition implies that producers of differentiated products face a more elastic demand in the international market. This raises the relative sizes of quantity responses to disturbances from either foreign or domestic sources. In this case exporters might perform well if there are positive shocks, but poorly if there are adverse shocks. In a related paper Feeney (1999) illustrates that the benefits of learning-by-doing and specialisation due to trade depend on the trade off between the gains from diversifying country-specific risks and the losses from the greater risk of exposure to industryspecific shocks.
Enhanced allocative and organisational efficiency produce once-only effects from trade on per capita incomes. New theories of trade and growth identify a number of routes through which greater openness might have longer lasting effects on the rate of growth. A key feature of many of these models is the 'love-of-variety' preferences introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . 2 There are two distinct versions of this approach. In one, all varieties of a good enter a representative consumers utility function and all are consumed. In the other, final goods are modelled as produced using varieties of intermediate inputs, with increasing returns in the number of varieties used.
3 The (non-Ricardian) versions of these models have increasing returns to scale, either because there is a fixed cost associated with the production of each variety, or because there are assumed to be increasing returns in the number of different varieties of intermediate inputs. 4 In the model with differentiated varieties of finished goods, trade expands the number of varieties that are produced and hence expands utility, and potentially productive efficiency (Feenstra et al, 1999) . In the alternative model with differentiated varieties of intermediate inputs, trade again expands the number of varieties, but this is met through increasing returns and economies of scale in incumbent firms, generating rises in productivity per firm. Consumer welfare again rises, as lower costs of production are passed through to the prices of final goods.
In endogenous growth models such as those proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1991) the generation of new product varieties via trade makes it cheaper and easier to invent new varieties. Exposure to foreign markets might also improve the efficiency of the firm and raise growth either through learning from foreign rivals or through spillovers of technologies and knowledge. For instance, firms that participate in export markets might gain access to technical expertise regarding product designs and production methods from their foreign buyers (Clerides et al, 1998; Egan and Mody, 1992) . International knowledge spillovers arising from trade or cross-border investment expand the stock of ideas that may be used for research in each country. Successful R&D can then generate growth through expansion in the variety and quality of domestically produced goods and services. Thus the rate of technological progress is endogenous.
However there is no guarantee that trade liberalisation will promote growth in such models (Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000) . If countries become increasingly specialised in low-tech sectors in which little or no R&D takes place, then resources may be diverted away from the activities that help to promote long-term growth. Older, unresolved arguments over the need to protect 'infant industries' also suggest that there are circumstances in which the maintenance of trade restrictions might promote long-run performance.
Thus there may be a variety of channels through which exporting could generate improvements in the relative performance of exporting firms. Some of these channels, such as competition, economies of scale, entry and exit and knowledge spillovers, are already known to be general influences on productivity growth. There is a large literature on the relationship between exporting and growth. We begin by reviewing the aggregate cross-country evidence before turning to some more recent evidence from microeconometric studies of individual firms.
IV.2 International Trade: Macroeconometric Evidence
The widespread belief that openness is linked to growth has until recently had considerable support in the literature. Ben-David et al (2000, Chapter 1 Annex Table  1 ) cite twenty empirical studies published between 1977 and 1998 which use crosscountry evidence and trade policy indicators and which find that open and outward orientated economies tend to enjoy faster economic growth. The indicators used include trade ratios, tariff levels and indices of price and exchange rate distortions. The strong policy implication is that countries should seek to dismantle barriers to trade, as emphasised frequently in the policy recommendations provided by most of the major inter-governmental organisations.
In a further study not included in the literature cited by Ben-David et al, Frankel and Romer (1999) also report a significant positive association between international trade and per capita income using cross-sectional data for 150 countries in 1985. They find that a rise of 1 percentage point in the ratio of trade to GDP raises income by between ½-2 per cent. An important feature of their study is the recognition of the difficulty of attributing causality in cross-sectional regressions of this kind. If richer countries tend to trade more, or can afford to forego many trade policy restrictions, then causality may run from income to policy. Frankel and Romer seek to overcome this by using information on geographical characteristics to construct an instrument for trade.
5 One other important point to note about their study is that it relates to trade shares, not trade policies. Some countries may have extremely liberalised policies, and contestable markets but still experience low levels of trade relative to GDP because of their size or location. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) have recently questioned the reliability of many of the results concerning the consequences of trade policies (as opposed to the level of trade) for growth. They argue that in some cases the indicators of openness are poor measures of trade barriers, or highly correlated with other variables that are themselves likely determinants of growth, such as the quality of institutions or macroeconomic stability. In other cases the econometric techniques used in some studies are argued to be inappropriate, and re-estimation using different techniques and controls for other policy and institutional variables results in significantly weaker findings. For example, one study they consider is that of Frankel and Romer. Reestimating their model with additional dummies to control for geographic characteristics such as climate, Rodríguez and Rodrik find that the trade regressor becomes a statistically insignificant determinant of per capita incomes. Similar results are reported by Jones (2000) who finds that trade policy measures tend to become insignificant in cross-country growth regressions which include the broader measure of the quality of institutions developed by Knack and Keefer (1995) .
IV.3 International Trade: Microeconometric Evidence
Until recently most econometric work on trade and growth has been undertaken with aggregate data. There is no guarantee in such studies that firms experiencing faster productivity growth are ones which have entered the export market. The growing number of firm-level econometric studies on newly available longitudinal data sets permits a direct assessment of the structure of the underlying causal relationships between trade and performance. Pain and te Velde (2000) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on the impact of exporting on corporate performance. Other aspects of the relationship between openness and plant level growth in developing countries are reviewed by Tybout (2000) .
The benefits of openness and exporting should show up in the performance of individual firms, as well as in the overall level of welfare and growth in the economy. The stylised facts in many developing economies appear consistent with these arguments; in most countries exporting firms tend to be larger, older and more innovative than other firms (Tybout, 2000) . However they are also consistent with a counter argument that a self-selection process is at work. It is only the better performing firms that are able to enter international markets because they are the ones able to bear the sunk costs associated with entry into foreign markets and the more intense competitive pressures there. We review the evidence from recent studies for a number of developing countries.
The impact of exporting on firm performance in East Asia has been studied for Taiwan and Korea. Aw et al (1998) use quinquennial Census data for five exportintensive industries -textiles, apparel, plastics, electrical engineering and transportation equipment. Liu et al (1999) undertake a study of Taiwanese electronics industry, using a smaller, annual panel data set. The pattern of their results is consistent with findings for developed economies such as the United States (Bernard and Jensen, 1999) , with considerable support for the self-selection hypothesis, and limited evidence of learning by exporting. On average exporters have significantly higher levels of productivity than non-exporters, and firms that enter the export market have higher productivity than non-exporters prior to entry. This is found for all of the industries studied. Firms that exit the export market have lower levels of productivity than continuous exporters, and the differential continues to widen after exit, although by an insignificant amount in some industries.
Continuous exporters do not appear to perform significantly better than non-exporters, and in some industries in Taiwan appear to perform significantly worse, when evaluated using total factor productivity. However Aw et al (1998, Table 4 ) do find that the total factor productivity (TFP) differential between entrants and non-exporters continues to widen after entry in four out of five industries in Taiwan and Korea. In three cases -textiles, plastics and electronics in Taiwan, this effect is significant. This is the only real evidence of any potential gains from exporting.
The learning-by-exporting hypothesis has also been tested by Clerides et al (1998) using plant level data for Columbia and firm level data for Mexico and Morocco. Although their methodology differs from the studies for East Asia, their evidence is consistent with them. Plants that become exporters have higher productivity prior to entry into export markets, but typically do not experience marked increases in relative productivity after entry. Separate estimates of cost functions for individual industries reveals only two -apparel and leather goods in Morocco, where past exporting experience has a significant negative impact on current average variable costs.
An interesting feature of Clerides et al (1998) is that they also attempt to test for externalities from exporting in Columbia. The evidence across industries is mixed, but there is some support for the hypothesis that a firm is more likely to export if it belongs to an export-intensive industry or region. They also find that firms in exportorientated regions tend to enjoy relatively lower costs than firms in other regions, irrespective of export status, although in several cases these differentials are not significantly different from zero. This provides some weak evidence in favour of externalities from exporting. Bleaney et al (2000) investigate the learning-by-exporting hypothesis using survey data on a sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. In contrast to the other studies discussed here, their focus is on employment levels, rather than measures of productive efficiency. They report a significant positive correlation between current employment levels and past export status. Since they control for past employment levels the evidence also implies that employment growth has also been higher in exporting firms, which is consistent with the hypothesis that exporting improves allocative efficiency.
Thus the overall evidence on the impact of greater international openness to trade is mixed. Whilst there cannot be an automatic presumption that increasing exports will generate faster economic growth, the learning-by-exporting hypothesis cannot be ruled out completely. However most exporting firms appear to have experienced more rapid improvements in productivity prior to entry into export markets. Of course the pursuit of liberal trade policies by national governments, and the consequent encouragement of firms to enter international markets, may be an important factor that encourages domestic firms to make the investments that enhance their productivity, but there is no direct evidence of this.
The microeconometric evidence suggests that exporting plants have an absolute productivity advantage over non-exporting plants, implying that they are more likely to be close to the production possibility frontier for their industry. Part of the explanation for the faster productivity growth of non-exporters thus may simply be that they can benefit from eliminating technical inefficiencies as well as from technological advances. Part of the explanation for the faster growth of exporters in the year or so after entry into the export market may simply be that greater exposure to international competition quickly eliminates many remaining inefficiencies. If learning-by-exporting is more important for young or new plants, with older plants having successfully incorporated knowledge of best practices, then we would expect to see a permanent effect on the level of productivity following export market entry, but not a permanent effect on growth.
IV.4 Openness and Foreign Direct Investment
Openness to foreign direct investment can also improve the prospects for growth and development. Inflows of foreign investment can modernise and expand the stock of physical and human capital in the economy, helping to fill what Romer (1993) termed 'object gaps'. This is particularly important where domestic resources are insufficient to cover the investment required by the economy. It increases the productive capacity of the economy and can influence employment levels. By bringing access to foreign technology and management techniques, and by making available products and processes that embody foreign knowledge, FDI also helps to close 'idea gaps' and augment the stock of domestic knowledge. This can improve efficiency of production and raise the average productivity level of the entire economy (Barrell and Pain, 1997) . If domestic firms adopt the new production processes, then there will be beneficial externalities from inward investment. FDI can also have an impact on growth levels through trade, if foreign firms are export orientated and improve the variety and quality products produced in host economies, or provide domestic firms with information on how to access export markets. Barrell, Holland and Pain (2000) summarise the available literature on the impact of foreign direct investment in the transition economies.
However, again there can be no automatic presumption that inward investment will be beneficial (Moran, 1998) . The introduction of labour-saving techniques may not be desirable in a country with a large supply of labour and little capital. Equally entry of a dominant foreign firm can harm competition, particularly if there are barriers to entry and the institutions required for effective domestic regulation have yet to be developed. Promises of protective tariffs to prevent imports from competing against a foreign investor for the domestic market will almost certainly reduce consumer welfare and reduce the potential benefits to be gained from inward investment.
The empirical literature on multinationals and development is extensive, with detailed surveys provided recently by Blomström et al (2000) and Caves (1999) . They suggest that spillovers from inward investment can be an important source of economic growth for developing economies, but there is no strong consensus on the associated magnitudes, and the impact can vary by country and by industry. This points to the significance of local conditions in host countries and the need to adopt policies that complement inward investment. A high level of local competence and a competitive environment have both been found to raise the absorptive capacity of host economies. Borenzstein et al. (1998) find that the effect of foreign direct investment on growth is much weaker in countries with relatively low levels of education attainment. Skilled labour can be utilised to help upgrade and adapt existing proprietary technologies. Balasubramanyam et al (1996) find that the impact of inward investment on growth is much larger in countries with export-promoting policies, and hence open and contestable markets, than in countries with import-substituting ones. Domestic content requirements and protection from external competition appear to reduce the chances of receiving and benefiting fully from inward investment. Import substituting regimes tend to attract stand-alone foreign plants operating at sub-optimal scale. Exportorientated regimes allow the foreign subsidiary to undertake just those tasks for which the host location is best suited.
The level of human capital and skills are particularly important in ensuring that there is not too large a gap between the capabilities of foreign companies and indigenous firms who hope to be able to benefit from their presence. Caves (1999) argues that in service sectors much depends on matching managerial capabilities. Services are commonly produced at the site of consumption and may therefore generate demonstration-type spillovers. But if foreign firms are much larger than domestic firms, the range of tasks undertaken and the degree of supervision required will be very different and the example provided by the foreign subsidiary may not be widely applicable.
In a cross-sectional analysis of per capita manufacturing exports from 33 developing countries in 1995, UNCTAD (1999, Box VIII.6) find a significant positive association between exports and inward FDI per capita after controlling for the level of domestic R&D expenditure and the size of the domestic manufacturing sector. The reported results imply that a rise of 1 per cent in FDI per capita would be associated with a 0.45 per cent rise in the value of manufactured exports per capita, with the strongest effects being felt in high-technology exports. Barrell et al (2000) report related evidence indicating that foreign firms have improved the export performance of the Visegrad economies and China in recent years.
IV.5 Trade Policies And Inward Investment: Lessons From Mexico
Foreign direct investment has expanded rapidly in Mexico during the present decade. Over the five years since the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) inflows of direct investment have averaged 2.9 per cent of GDP per annum, compared to 1.2 per cent per annum over the previous fifteen years. 6 A distinguishing feature of these inflows is that over half of them have been in the manufacturing sector, a much bigger proportion than in the other major Latin American economies. Whilst entry into NAFTA and geographical proximity to the United States have clearly helped to make Mexico a more attractive investment location, there have also been important reforms to the policy framework (Graham and Wada, 2000) . There are also several academic studies that demonstrate that foreign investors have had a beneficial impact on domestic firms in Mexico, suggesting that it may offer important lessons for the design and effectiveness of trade and investment policies.
For many years the emphasis in Mexico lay in regulating rather than promoting foreign investment. The domestic market was heavily protected by tariff barriers and foreign investment was seen as an alternative means by which foreign countries could attempt to gain control over the Mexican economy. Policy was governed by a 1973 statute limiting foreign involvement in most industries to minority participation subject to prior authorisation from the federal government. With the exception of a jump in resource-based inflows in 1980-81, at a time when oil prices were strong, inward investment remained modest. High and volatile inflation in the 1980s, and the associated possibility of debt defaults also acted to deter investors (Slemrod and Shah, 1995) .
In the mid-1980s important market-orientated reforms began to be introduced in several sectors. Small to medium levels of investment for foreign majority participation became exempt from prior government approval, trade barriers began to be lowered and regulations governing special export zones were relaxed. The present inward investment regime was codified in the Foreign Investment Law which came into force in December 1993. The law was one of a series of measures designed to liberalise trade and capital markets prior to entry into NAFTA from 1994. In effect it helped to lock-in many of the previous reforms that had liberalised the institutional framework of the country (Blomström and Kokko, 1997) . The law opened more areas of the economy to foreign ownership, provided national treatment for most foreign investors, eliminated all performance requirements for foreign investment projects and liberalised the criteria applied for automatic approval of foreign investment projects.
Foreign firms have consistently identified bureaucracy, slow government decisiontaking and lack of transparency as obstacles to investment in Mexico. Measures have thus been taken to improve the transparency of the regulatory system. An Economic Deregulation Council was established in 1995 to review all rules and regulations of the federal government. The thrust of this reform was to remove regulations, unless it could be shown there was a clear justification for government involvement, and to minimise any adverse impact on businesses.
For many years widespread use was made of special corporate tax incentives in Mexico (Feltenstein and Shah, 1995) . Most of these have now been removed, with greater emphasis given to maintaining a competitive corporate tax rate. High inflation and high nominal interest rates in the 1980s left many firms facing financing constraints. Credits against future taxes were of less use than reductions in tax rates which immediately benefited cash-flows. Account was also taken of tax reforms in the major source of inward investment, the United States. Tax rates above those in the US act as a disincentive, but tax rates significantly below those in the US may simply transfer revenue to the US Treasury, since a higher proportion of an identical tax liability will be paid in the United States because of the way in which the United States taxes the foreign source income of its companies. Recognition of this has led to the elimination of most direct tax incentives in Mexico.
Inward investment may also have been encouraged by the obligations imposed on direct investment policy by provisions in the NAFTA Treaty designed to ensure that state and local governments accord national treatment to investors from NAFTA countries. Graham and Wada (2000) argue that this enhanced the credibility of investment liberalisation, since violation of the NAFTA provisions could be subject to sanctions or require the payment of monetary damages. entry into NAFTA, and meant that the Mexican economy was well placed to exploit fully the improved access it received in the North American marketplace. Historically, inward investment in the Mexican manufacturing sector was often geared to serving the protected domestic market rather than markets abroad. Many measures were introduced to try and stimulate exports from inward investment projects, with performance requirements imposed on foreign investors in the late 1970s to force imports to be balanced by exports. These measures were not particularly successful, with the export propensities of US owned foreign affiliates in Mexico remaining well below those in other developing countries, as can be seen from Table 5 . Policy changes in the mid-1980s led to the Mexican government making more active use of priority development areas and targeted incentives for export-orientated investments. Import-substituting policies were ended in 1985 and the government announced that it was joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. At that time there were export controls on 85 per cent of non-petroleum exports (Hanson, 1998) . By the end of 1987 export controls had been abolished completely and average tariffs on imports were half what they had been in 1985. Mexico had originally begun to permit export assembly operations following the Border Industrialisation Programme in 1965. Plants located in a free-trade zone next to the border with the United States were granted certain exemptions if they exported all of their output in the so-called 'macquiladora' programme. In 1972 the government began to allow the creation of free trade zones in other parts of the country. In 1988 the government began to allow plants in these zones to sell up to half of their output on the domestic market (Hanson, 1995) . The combination of this reform, together with the gradual relaxation of controls over new investment led to a rapid rise in the level of exportorientated investments. Macquiladora employment rose from 212,000 in 1986 to 430,000 in 1989 and 940,000 by 1997. There are now estimated to be some 107 export processing zones in Mexico, with the firms located in them employing around 1 million people.
an example. Up to 1985 inward investments were limited to joint ventures, operating in subscale plants with production primarily geared to a domestic market protected by import quotas. The acceptance of a major, wholly-owned, export-orientated investment from IBM in 1985 was followed by investment expansion packages from existing inward investors to expand their operations to allow higher levels of exports.
The rapid expansion in export-orientated investments has been reflected in a rise in the relative export propensity of US foreign affiliates in Mexico as shown in Table 6 . The rising trend between 1983 and 1993 has subsequently accelerated markedly since the formation of NAFTA. The export processing zones continue to offer special incentives. Exemptions from import taxes are granted for equipment and goods to be re-exported and for certain inputs into production, such as machinery and equipment of exports.
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The use of export processing zones and trade policy reform has changed the economic geography of Mexico (Hanson, 1998) . Industrial activity has shifted away from the largest centre of population Mexico City, to northern states on the US border. Entry into NAFTA has accelerated the integration of Mexican plants into the corporate production systems of major US automobile and electrical manufacturers. Ford of Mexico has changed its entire production strategy, building new engine and vehicle assembly plants to serve the North American market. Macquiladora facilities were utilised to help integrate part production with operations in the United States (Mortimore, 1998) . However the rapid speed with which Mexico has been able to raise exports owes much to the institutional reforms introduced in the 1980s, liberalising trade policies and improving incentives for export-orientated investments.
Research suggests that foreign manufactures in Mexico act as export catalysts for domestic firms. In a study covering the period from 1986-90 Aitken et al (1997) found that the probability of an indigenous firm exporting was positively correlated with proximity to multinational firms, but not with proximity to general export activity. This suggests that foreign firms have brought wider benefits to the economy, possibly by helping to upgrade the standards of local suppliers and management and by providing information about foreign markets. Mexico now has the fifth highest level of exports of all developing economies and is the largest developing country exporter of automotive products.
There have also been a number of studies of the impact of foreign-owned firms on the productivity of Mexican firms. The findings from these studies are summarised in detail in Blomström and Kokko (1998) . Foreign presence does appear to have a positive impact on the rate of growth of local productivity. This effect is weaker in those industries in which the products and technologies of foreign companies have little in common with those of local firms. Spillovers and learning by example are much stronger in industries in which foreign and domestic firms are in competition with each other, suggesting that a limited foreign presence in a previously protected market may be more beneficial than a situation where foreign affiliates hold dominant market shares.
Mexico points to the importance of complementary trade and industrial policies in host countries as determinants of the magnitude and scope of spillovers and the export potential from inward investment. Reforms to improve the skills of the workforce and the technological capabilities of domestic producers may still be needed to generate the full benefits from openness. There remains concern about the level of linkages between foreign firms and domestic suppliers and about the level of domestically financed R&D (Lall, 1998) . In some cases local supplier industries have found it difficult to raise technological levels to international standards (Mortimore, 1998) .
Mexico has always had the natural advantage of geographical proximity to the large market in the United States, but this by itself did not lead to significant levels of inward investment. Investment promotion policies have had to be refocused and incentives carefully targeted. Reforms to the institutional framework governing trade and investment were also required. These created the market conditions which enabled Mexico to benefit rapidly from the formation of NAFTA.
IV.6 Openness and Growth: A Summary
A reasonable summary of the evidence on trade and growth and inward investment might be that it is consistent with the hypothesis that greater openness helps to raise per capita incomes, but there is a large amount of uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the effects and it is likely to depend on a range of host country and external characteristics. There is little evidence in favour of the opposite view that trade protection is beneficial for sustained economic growth, suggesting that reforms should more appropriately be biased towards trade liberalisation. It should also be remembered that growth is not the same as welfare. If openness helps to raise the number of relatively high productivity firms in the liberalising economy, then the overall level of allocative efficiency in the economy will improve, as will living standards.
There is nothing in the present literature to indicate what an appropriate level of openness might be. In general, smaller economies tend to have higher levels of trade relative to GDP simply because there are fewer domestic consumers for producers to trade with. It is quite possible that significant trade restrictions are costly but more modest restrictions are not (Collier and Gunning, 1999) . There are clearly some economies such as North Korea which have fallen behind as a result of remaining closed to the outside world for the last fifty years, and others, such as Hong Kong which have experienced sustained growth associated with their openness. However these are extremes, and it may be difficult to generalise from their collective experience.
For practical reasons it may not be sensible for many developing economies to rush and eliminate all of their tariffs. This is because trade taxes are an important proportion of the overall level of tax revenue. Trade taxes were still over 30 per cent of total tax revenue in Africa in the mid-1990s, and 24 per cent of revenues in the Asia-Pacific region and 21 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean (Oyejide, 2000) . Whilst it is easy to broaden the legal definition of the tax base, collecting the revenues due can be done only when administrative capacities develop. Thus for many countries, particularly low-income ones, it is unrealistic to expect that they will agree to the immediate abolition of all their remaining tariffs, even if they can be persuaded of the need to ensure their regimes of trade protection are as simple and transparent as possible. Equally the adoption of WTO mandated customs valuation procedures can often not be undertaken without investments in order to improve the administration of customs points (Finger and Schuler, 2000) .
V. Openness and Institutions
Considerations over the risk attached to investment may be particularly important in determining the level of investment in developing economies. Evaluations of risk are typically driven by the general institutional framework of the economy, as well as the rules and regulations that govern the entry and operations of foreign investors. The prospects for political and macroeconomic stability together with the transparency of the legal regulations governing factors such as foreign ownership of land, tax liabilities and profit repatriation all matter to potential investors (Jun and Singh, 1996) .
It is clear that being open to outside influences has been important in the success of a number of developing countries. However, as Rodrik (2000) argues, this by itself is not sufficient to ensure sustained growth. Strong public institutions are also important complementary determinants of economic performance. A set of political and economic institutions that encourage transactions at minimal cost and credible commitment helps to raise the efficiency of market orientated economies (North, 1997) . Secure property rights and the prompt enforcement of legal obligations are likely to be especially important. Even well-defined property rights may be of little immediate benefit if they do not confer 'control rights' over the associated stream of income from those assets. Brunetti et al (1997) investigate the relationship between foreign direct investment inflows and the findings from a survey of the institutional framework as perceived by private firms in twenty transition economies in 1997. They focus on five particular topics: the predictability of rules, political stability, security of property rights, reliability of the judiciary and the extent of corruption. All were individually found to be significant positive determinants of the level of FDI inflows between 1993 and 1995, apart from the predictability of rules. The security of property rights and political stability were also found to be significant determinants of per capita income growth over the same period.
A wholescale transformation of society is at the heart of the development process (Stiglitz, 1998 and . Financial institutions are central to a functioning market economy, as are secure property rights, enforceable contracts and regulatory institutions. Systems of social insurance and conflict management also have to be established to help provide stability and cohesion at a time of systemic re-organisation. Desirable institutional arrangements may vary from country to country, reflecting both societal norms as well as what is practicable given the present state of development (Rodrik, 2000) . In a second-best world some transitional institutions and seemingly distortionary trade policies may be more effective than 'best practice' institutions initially, as removing one distortion may be counterproductive in the presence of other distortions. For instance policies of mass privatisation and capital account convertibility in Russia in the 1990s created incentives for asset-stripping and capital flight because they were implemented at a time when reforms to the judiciary and the enforcement of property rights had barely begun. In contrast, closed capital accounts in China enabled the financial system to utilise domestic savings to provide support for domestic investors. Sequencing reform can be very important, and trade and capital market liberalisation cannot be seen in isolation from other components of a development strategy. Rodrik (2000) argues that the key factor for many developing economies is not their international openness but the fact that they have successfully built institutions that have enabled them to manage the consequences of international openness.
If markets are competitive, and institutions are in place to ensure they remain competitive, greater international openness will raise average per capita incomes by enhancing allocative efficiency. However this does not mean that there will be political support for such policies. If trade and investment are confined to small enclaves they may do little to spur development in the medium term (Stiglitz, 1998) .
There is also a question of the extent and mechanisms by which those who gain from openness will compensate those who lose. If such compensation is to occur within developing countries, then systems of social insurance or a progressive and enforceable tax structure are required. If compensation, in the form of official assistance, is to come from developed countries then multilateral agreement over the indicators that should form the basis for the level of assistance will be needed. If compensation does not come at all, there is a risk that exclusion from the benefits of openness will lead to dissenting voices against liberalisation.
The clear message from the literature is that openness to trade and investment and liberalised trade policies are only part, albeit an important one, of a development strategy, not a substitute for it. Developing economies can gain from openness provided they ensure a competitive market environment and are able to invest in the public institutions that facilitate the workings of open and competitive markets. In many cases assistance from the industrialised economies is essential for this to occur, and this needs to be recognised and accepted if future trade negotiations are to be successful and improve the prospects for development.
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A related issue is whether many developing countries have a sufficient administrative capacity to participate fully in multilateral trade negotiations. Sampson (2000) argues that many do not have sufficient resources to participate meaningfully in the large number of meetings that take place at the WTO. Again, technical assistance and training from the industrialised economies should help some countries to participate more effectively by developing the necessary mechanisms to analyse the implications of proposals under negotiation (Oyejide, 2000) . These resource constraints also strengthen the case for any negotiations to have a tightly focused agenda in order to minimise the risk of exclusion from the negotiating process. Mechanisms to facilitate co-operation and joint action amongst the developing economies may also be needed, as it is unlikely to be feasible for all 139 (or more) members of the WTO to participate fully in every individual stage of the negotiating process.
In the remainder of this paper we consider some of the key areas in which negotiations may take place and draw on the literature on openness and growth to highlight some of the key issues for developing economies. Although we do not discuss manufactures trade in any detail, it is clear from the discussion of the data in Section II that this is also likely to be an area of considerable interest to developing economies.
VI. Trade Policy Issues for Developing Countries
VI.1 Agriculture
A key feature of the Uruguay Round was the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). This agreement had three main components -reforms to improve market access, reductions in export subsidies and cuts in domestic producer subsidies. As is clear from Table 1 , the level of protection in agriculture tends to be considerably higher than in manufacturing, although the process of tariffication in the Uruguay Round has at least served to make the degree of protection more transparent. Agricultural liberalisation primarily requires further reforms to end the high levels of agricultural support in many developed countries, notably in Europe and Japan. The AoA laid out a timetable for reductions in agricultural support, including an end to the Multi-Fibre Agreement, but much of this was end-dated and is due to be completed only by 2005.
The impact on developing economies of planned and any future reforms to agricultural policies is far from uniform. Producers of agricultural produce stand to gain significantly from improved market access in the industrialised economies. Economies such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile and the Philippines all stand to make significant gains (Panagariya, 2000) . However because reductions in subsidies are likely to raise prices, countries that are net food importers might experience difficulties in implementing any agreement. As the experience of Indonesia showed in the Asian crisis, the forced imposition of reforms that raise domestic food prices significantly can cause significant political disruption, especially in the absence of democratic institutions for conflict management (Rodrik, 2000) .
Any negotiations should allow for such difficulties as far as possible. Significant food aid might also be required for a period of time to augment existing social safety nets. Oyejide (2000) highlights the potential difficulties that many African economies may face, and it is clear from Table 2 that the share of food products in imports is higher there than elsewhere.
One area in which developing countries may also face pressures for reform lies in health and safety standards, as codified in the WTO agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. The principle aim of these measures is to maintain food product quality and safety, partly to assuage consumer concern in developed countries. Yet in effect standards are being imposed which many developing economies may not be able to meet without access to new production technologies and technical assistance. Openness is likely to be essential if knowledge of this kind is to be acquired.
VI.2 Services
One of the major results of the Uruguay Round negotiations was the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The primary goal of this measure was to obtain market access commitments from as many countries and in as many service sectors as possible. Perhaps inevitably the areas in which fewest commitments were made tended to be low skill, labour intensive activities, where developing countries tend to have a comparative advantage. One important area in which some progress has been made concerns the liberalisation of market access in areas such as finance and telecommunications, helping to facilitate foreign direct investments in some developing economies.
Arguably the main priority of future negotiations should be to ensure that the GATS covers all service sector activities and expands market access commitments. Network effects are especially important for many service sector providers and a presence in the foreign market is often essential for trade to take place.
Developing countries can stand to make significant gains from service sector liberalisation and this should allow them to offer some commitments in any future round of negotiations. Opening up their own service sectors, including government procurement, can help to reduce market segmentation and allow foreign suppliers to bring in new technologies. This is the route which many of the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe have chosen to take. The alternative is to maintain inefficient production techniques which de facto amount to a tax on consumers. Areas such as telecommunications, energy supply and transportation may all be appropriate candidates for greater liberalisation. However for competition to flourish, especially in utility industries in which there is a semi-monopoly provider, there again needs to be complementary investments in regulatory institutions (Mattoo, 2000) . This has to be recognised in drawing up the likely timescale for any reforms.
One important aspect of trade in services which should be part of any negotiations on services concerns the opportunities for migration by workers from developing economies into industrialised ones. Negotiators failed to make much progress on this issue during the Uruguay Round. Quotas, qualification requirements and the application of economic needs tests are frequently applied to prevent the entry of service suppliers. Liberalising entry requirements in developed countries again provides potential gains to developing countries, not just because it may raise service exports, but because it can also raise the exposure of migrants to new ideas and working practices in the industrialised economies. Returning workers can augment the stock of knowledge in their home economies. Industrialised countries can gain by relieving labour market pressures from shortages of particular types of labour.
A widely cited example of the potential for exports of services from developing countries is the Indian software industry. Exports in 1999-2000 amounted to US$4 billion, and accounted for around 10½ per cent of total export revenue in that period (NASSCOM, 2000) . Software exports had been just $225 million in 1992-93. Approximately 58 per cent of exports in 1999-00 were accounted for by on-site services, i.e. through the temporary movement of programmers, and hence were dependent upon the availability of visas in the major industrialised economies, particularly the United States. Liberalisation of regulations has helped. The shortage of labour in the US IT sector led to a rise in the annual cap on the number of temporary work visas available to foreign nationals from 65,000 in the early 1990s to 115,000 in 1999 and 2000. Current proposals before the US Congress suggest a potential further rise to 200,000 by 2002.
Whilst this reduction in trade barriers has helped to raise the level of trade, the opportunities for development of the domestic market in India have remained limited. The technologies required for advanced IT equipment cannot yet be utilised fully because of inadequate and outdated telecoms infrastructure. Thus export revenue accounted for 70 per cent of the total revenue of the software industry in 1999-2000. In summary, the use of export zones and the availability of a low-cost pool of English speaking skilled labour has helped to attract and retain software investments, and a reduction in barriers in the industrialised economies has allowed exports to expand. But it has not been sufficient to ensure that the full potential benefits of these investments have been felt throughout the economy.
VI.3 Standards
Standards have become an increasingly important issue in international trade. The Uruguay Round TRIPS agreement obliged all WTO members to enforce intellectual property rights, although some developing countries were allowed some years to adjust to this. The TRIPS agreement involved significant changes in national legislation, and also the creation of new institutions in many developing countries. This was the first clear attempt to harmonise regulatory standards across all WTO members, with the standards in question being those of the industrialised countries rather than the developing ones. It also marked a departure from the longstanding GATT principle of negotiations and agreements not to do certain things .
In any exercise of this kind it is difficult to strike the appropriate balance between encouraging domestic innovation and technology transfer against the possibility of the restricted diffusion of new products and processes. Given that most process and product innovations are achieved by producers in the industrialised countries, the protection of those patentable innovations is in itself likely to transfer incomes from developing countries to the industrialised ones. Set against this is the possibility that enhanced patent protection improves the incentives to undertake innovation as well as the incentives for foreign-owned firms to transfer new technologies into subsidiaries in developing economies. This may raise the overall level of allocative efficiency in the host economies, and hence living standards, even if there are fewer possibilities for the diffusion of technologies to developing country producers. However the evidence on the importance of such factors is limited. Blomström et al (2000) note that there is little evidence on the question of whether host country intellectual property regimes do have any bearing on the size or scope of spillover benefits from inward investment.
The trend towards discussion of standards has continued in recent years, with developed economies having attempted to force discussions over labour and environmental standards onto the Seattle agenda. Again the likely result would be to try and impose the standards of the industrialised economies on the developing economies. It should be clear that such measures have nothing to do with improving market access and contestability, and in effect simply deprive many developing countries of important elements of their comparative advantage in trade (Oyejide, 2000) . This does not mean that such issues should not be discussed in multilateral fora, as there can be important international externalities. It is simply that they are best done so in more appropriate settings such as the International Labour Organisation. The openness and growth literature does not highlight these factors as being important for development, and imposition of them, with a potential threat of trade sanctions if action was not taken, would impose significant compliance costs on developing economies.
VI.4 Trade-Related Investment Measures
The GATT was concerned with cross-border trade in goods. The WTO is concerned also with the treatment of foreign enterprises and natural persons. At present the treatment of foreign investment in the WTO agreements is fragmented. Market access for foreign investors in service sectors is part of the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) prevents host countries from imposing some performance requirements on foreign investors.
The rapid growth in foreign direct investment over the past decade means that there are now many governmental and non-governmental organisations pressing for further investment-related measures. The potential agenda is broad, ranging from the liberalisation of market access in other industries, through governing the rules of 'locational tournaments' to attract foreign investors, to obtaining agreement on a comprehensive list of industrial policies to do with technology transfer, licensing requirements and the enforcement of joint ventures. All of these matter for the development process and it is important that there is a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of any industrial policy as well as consideration of the effects of excessive competition with other countries. But, as with standards, the extent to which these issues are trade related is questionable (Bora et al, 2000; Panagariya, 2000) . The failed negotiations between OECD member states for a multilateral agreement on investment provide an indication of the likely difficulties there will be in reaching agreements on these issues. If the wider aspects of investment liberalisation are to be kept within the auspices of the WTO it would seem preferable to establish an entirely independent framework for negotiation, with a timetable separate from that for further trade and market access negotiations.
VI.5 Special and Differential Treatment
It has been recognised for some time that many developing countries, particularly the low income ones, would always face difficulties in implementing many of the measures discussed in the multilateral rounds. This was reflected in the concept of 'Special and Differential Treatment' (SDT). During the Tokyo Round SDT provisions were used to grant some countries exemption from particular rules and enhance their market access via tariff preferences. The emphasis during the Uruguay Round was different, with a concentration on the construction of rules that would apply to all participants, with developing countries granted only additional time to implement obligations. Whilst this has the merit of ultimately generating a simplified global trading system, it raises the risk of over-burdening many developing countries because of their lack of the complementary institutional capacity. Wang and Winters (2000) argue that the concept of special and differential treatment needs to be re-invented if a future trade round is to be successful. Tariff preferences granted by the industrialised economies may not be appropriate, partly because tariff levels are now so low in some products and partly because they may be accompanied by quantitative restrictions in others. A better approach would be to seek agreement over measurable criteria that could be used to classify economies according to their state of development, and then relate the timescale and extent of SDT to their progress against these criteria. Oyejide (2000) makes a related argument, and suggests that the World Bank's criteria for classifying countries into high, middle and low-income countries would be an obvious choice, as it already has widespread acceptance.
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VII. Concluding Comments
The evidence from a wide range of studies suggests that a sound institutional and legal framework, along with timely and predictable enforcement of the rules embodied in that framework, is essential if reforms to trade and investment policies are to have significant effects in developing countries. Political and macroeconomic stability, security of property rights, reliability of the judiciary, strong regulatory institutions and an absence of corruption are especially important. Without a strategy that tailors market-based reforms to existing institutional and social capabilities, or one that provides the necessary financial and technical assistance to facilitate the development of new institutions, greater international openness is likely to be of little use. With it, liberalisation of trade policies might well provide a successful stimulus to development.
In the absence of multilateral agreements, regional and bilateral preferential agreements can be expected to proliferate. The number of regional trade agreements in force has already risen from 62 in December 1994 to 113 by the end of 1999 (Sapir, 2000) . Whilst regional trading arrangements can still improve market access for developing countries and pave the way for economic co-operation in many areas, they are also more costly for countries with limited administrative capacity as each tends to have its own set of regulations and standards. Inevitably developing countries seeking to become part of NAFTA or to reach a preferential trade agreement with the EU, and undertaking bilateral negotiations, have little bargaining power and are forced to accept the existing rules of the club. In some cases existing trading arrangements may be disrupted. For instance transition economies that succeed in becoming members of the European Union will not be able to maintain any bilateral trade agreements that differ from the collective trade policies pursued by the Union as a whole.
Countries excluded from the current spread of regionalism will undoubtedly suffer some trade discrimination. In principle these countries might be eligible for compensation under GATT and WTO rules. In practice discrimination is difficult and costly to prove, and there can be little doubt that the collective interests of the developing economies would be best served by seeking, as far as possible, to maintain a common voice in tightly focused multilateral negotiations.
